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No. 78-740 
ANDRUS (Sec. of Interior) 1 i/ll 
v. 
ALLARD, et al. {Indian 
artifacts dealers) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The three judge District Court invalidated Fish 
and Wildlife Service regulations prohibiting the sale of ' ~ea-
'" thers taken from members of federally protected species prior 
~- -----
to the effective date of the protective laws. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The Eagle Protection Act makes 
it unlawful to capture or kill bald or golden eagles, or to 
possess or sell such eagles or their parts. The Act's prohi-
bitions exempt possession, but not sale, of birds and part~ of 
birds taken prior to its effective date. The Migratory Bird 









Treaty Act makes it unlawful to kill or capture birds of any 
species protected by treaty, or to possess or sell such birds 
or their parts, except as permitted by the Secretary's regu-
lations. This statute does not contain an exemption for birds 
taken before the date on which it became applicable. 
The Secretary has issued regulations implementing the two 
statutes. In each case, the regulations permit the possession 
of birds and parts of birds taken before their species became 
subject to federal protection, but prohibit the sale of such 
birds or their parts. 
v Appellees are dealers in American Indian artifacts. They 
-- ---
alleged in the complaint that they owned or did business in 
artifacts containing feathers taken from protected birds "which 
birds were obtained prior to the effective date of Federal pro-
tection of such birds." They sought injunctive relief against 
enforcement of the Secretary's regulations on the ground that 
they 1) exceeded his statutory authority and 2) violated the 
fifth amendment, by effecting a taking without compensation and 
imposing an arbitrary and irrational restriction. 
A three judge district court was convened. It held that 
the regulations were invalid because the statutes, as construed 
by the court, did not prohibit the sale of feathers from birds 
taken before the applicable effective dates. It did not reach 
the constitutional question, but its construction of the sta-











sale of lawfully acquired feathers would constitute an uncons-
titutional taking of property without compensation. Accord-
ingly, it enjoined enforcement of the regulations as against 
the appellees' property rights in feathers owned before the 
applicable effective date. 
CONTENTIONS: The Secretary contends, first, that the regu-
lations are within the scope of the applicable statutes. He 
points out that the sale of previously acquired feathers is 
prohibited by the literal terms of the statutes. He observes 
that several lower courts have construed the Endangered Species 
Act as prohibiting the sale of previously acquired animals, and 
that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act has been sustained as for-
bidding the sale of offspring of parents acquired before the 
applicable effective date. 
Second, the Secretary contends that the fifth amendment 
allows prohibition of the sale of previously acquired fea-
thers. He argues that prohibiting the sale of goods is not a 
taking, and that in any event compensation for any taking is 
available by an action in the Court of Claims. The Secretary 
rejects the allegation that the prohibition is unconstitution-
ally irrational as a frivolous invocation of economic substan-
tive due process. He contends that the three district court 
decisions relied on by the court below, holding on the basis of 
constitutional considerations that the Migratory Bird Treaty 





before the applicable effective dates, have lost their persua-
sive force since they were decided in the 1920's. Finally he 
reads the portion of the complaint quoted at page 2, supra, as 
indicating that the appellees do not allege that they now own 
feathers which they obtained before the applicable effective 
dates. 
Third, on the basis of the preceding arguments, the Sec-
retary contends that appellees' constitutional claims were so 
insubstantial that it was improper to convene a three judge 
district court. Simultaneous with this appeal, the Secretary 
has filed an appeal with the Tenth Circuit. Accordingly, he 
urges the Court to remand with directions to enter a new judg-
ment which is appealable to the Tenth Circuit. 
There is no response. 
DISCUSSION: A three judge district court, and this Court on 
appeal therefrom, lacks jurisdiction if the "unsoundness [of the 
asserted constitutional claims] so clearly results from the 
previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject 
and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought 
to be raised can be the subject of controversy." Goosby v. 
Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 {1973). This Court recently indi-
cated that the availability of relief in the Court of Claims 
undermines appellees' constitutional taking claim as a basis 
for equitable relief. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 121, 126-27 {1974). 






feathers from protected species without regard for when the 
birds were killed. The agency responsible for enforcing the 
acts has so construed them, and in the case of the Eagle Pro-
tection Act it has adhered to that construction since 1963. 
There is no response. 
12/11/78 Lacy Opn in petn 
• -
The three- judge court here strained the plain language 
of the statutes in a n effort to avoid what it considered to . 
be an unconstitutional result: the absolute prohibition of 
sales of parts of eagles obtained before the effective date 
of the Acts. There is substantial room for doubt whether this 
restriction on the use of eagles constitutes a "taking" for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Even if it does, however, it 
appears that ~ ps have an adequate remedy before the CourE of 
Claims. Th.us , I believe that the three-judge court's constitutional 
.. -----
ooncern was misplaced and the strained reading the court gave the 
statutes is improper. 
Nonetheless, I doubt that the Court should grant plenary 
review here, as the question does not seem to be one of general 
i mportance . Moreover, because the ruling below is merely an 
interpretation of the statutory language, Congress can reverse 
the court by redrafting the statutes to deal explicitly with 
t h is problem. If you do not wish to put Congress to this task , 
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T~ z."'/,q f1M-L ~ ; ~ re~ . 
B E N C H M E M O R A N D U M 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 6 August 1979 
From: Gregory May 
NO. 78-740: ANDRUS V. ALLARD 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Do the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et 
seq., and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et 
seq., give the Secretary of the Interior authority to forbid 
the sale of Indian artifacts containing feathers from birds 
that were killed before their species came under federal 
protection? 
2. Does a ban on the sale of Indian artifacts 
containing feathers from birds that were killed before their 
species came under federal protection unconstitutionally take 




- - 2. 
FACTS 
Appellees deal in Indian artifacts, many of which 
contain the feathers of eagles and other protected species of 
birds. Appellees Douglas and Carol Allard and Robert Ward 
own feathered artifacts and operate stores that sell these 
artifacts and other Indian antiquities. Appellees Pierre and 
Sylvia Bevis operate a store that sells feathered artifacts 
on consignment. Appel lee Kelley works for the Bovises in 
their store. Appellee Eros, a professional appraiser of 
Indian antiquities, also owns feathered artifacts. 
In 1975, the Department of the Interior notified 
Indian crafts dealers that it intended to apply the Eagle Act --and the Migratory Bird Act to all feathered items, regardless 
of their age. That same year, appellees Douglas Allard and 
Pierre Bevis were convicted under the Acts for offering to 
sell antiquities containing the feathers of protected 
species. Bevis pled nolo, and Allard did not appeal. 
In 1978, appellees filed this federal action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of 
the Interior and certain subordinate officials. They alleged 
that neither the Eagle Act nor the Migratory Bird Act applied 
to feathers from birds killed before their species came under 
federal protection (pre-preservation feathers). If the Acts 
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a taking of property without just compensation. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, a three-
judge court ruled for appellees. Although the court assumed 
that no scientific method can distinguish between new and old 
feathers, it suggested that the current bird population could 
be protected by measures less drastic than a ban on the sale 
of pre-preservation feathers. The court mentioned resort to 
affidavits of acquisition, registration of feathers, and 
expert examination as alternative enforcement procedures. 
[J.S. Sa] 
The court expressed "grave doubts" whether the 
statutes would not constitute an unconstitutional taking of 
property if applied to pre-preservation feathers. [J.S. 13a] 
It noted that a line of federal criminal cases from the 
1920s, conscious of the constitutional problem, had refused 
to apply the statutes to pre-preservation feathers. [J. S. 
5a-6a] The court distinguished Delbay Pharmaceuticals v. 
Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1976), which 
construed the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S. C. § 1531 et 
seq., to prohibit the sale of animal products held before the 
enactment date. The legislative history of the bird 
preservation statutes, it found, disclosed no protective 
intent as sweeping as that behind the Endangered Species Act. 
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amendment to the Endangered Species Act and regulations under 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq., 
suggest a policy of due regard for vested property rights in 
the products of protected animals. [J.S. 10a-12a] Thus, the 
court concluded that the bird protection statutes could not 
be construed as applying to pre-preservation feathers. 
DISCUSSION 
I. STATUTORY CO~STRUCTION 
A. Eagle Protection Act 
(1) The language of the Eagle Protection Act 
strongly suggests that the Act proscribes the purchase, sale 
.:::-----
or exchange of pre-preservation feathers. ____________,. Section 668, 16 
U.S.C., makes it illegal (without a permit) to "take, 
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or 
barter, transport, export or import" any bald or golden 
eagle, "alive or dead, or any part . 
~ -- thereof II 
I\ The section then provides that nothing in the Act prohibits 
"po~ sion or transportation" of eagles or eagle parts taken 
before their species was protected. Thus, Congress appears 
to have banned trading in eagles or eagle parts no matter 
when the birds were taken. 
(2) The Act's legislative history contains no 
discussion of the proviso covering pre-preservation eagle 
a.:..1 dv,./...,,,._~.td h..r~ si--
~ ·''-46-.f.&. ~ ~~  ~
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parts. The 1962 amendment which brought golden eagles under 
the Act, however, deleted from the proviso a passage 
requiring defendants to bear the burden of proving that the 
eagle parts they possessed were taken before the bird was 
protected. Pub. L. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962). 
Throughout the recent legislative history is 
evidence of strong protective intent. Golden eagles were 
first protected in 1962 not because they were endangered, but 
because hunters frequently mistook juvenile bald eagles for 
golden eagles. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1986, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1-2 (1962); H.R. Rep. No. 1450, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(1962). Discussion surrounding the 1972 enactment of drastic 
new penalties for eagle hunting reemphasized Congress' 
protective intent. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 92-817, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1972). The legislative history of the 
------------
original enactment in 1940, however, is extremely thin and 
provides no help on this issue. 
( 3 ) Since 1964, Fish and Wildlife Service 
regulations under the Eagle Act have prohibited the purchase, 
sale, or exchange of eagles and eagle parts taken before the 
dates of federal protection. See 50 C.F.R. § 11.8(b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1964) [current version at 50 C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978)]. 
These regulations apparently rest on the obvious inference 
from the statutory language described in (1), supra. 
-
- - 6. 
Appellees contend, however, that they did not know 
the regulatory prohibition applied to feathered Indian 
artifacts. Although the record is not clear on this point, 
it may have been as late as 1975 that the Service notified 
Indian crafts dealers of its intention to enforce the 
regulation against them. [A. 17-18, 30-34] 
( 4 ) Appel lees primary argument against the 
~ Service's interpretation of the Eagle Act is that the eagle 
~ f ~ in Indian artifacts have lost their identity as 
"eagles" or "eagle parts." Appel lees note that the Eagle ~~ 
Act, unlike the Migratory Bird Act, does not prohibit 
~ ~ dealings in bird "products." Thus, they argue, feathered 
¥1~P-----,, ~t"' artifacts fall outside the scope of the Ea le Act. 
p 
This 
- result, they continue, is not surprising, since the trade in 
-
authentic native antiquities poses no threat to the current 
eagle population. It would be unthinkable, they say, to 
refurbish a genuine artifact with new feathers. 
Brief at 7-8, 17-18] 
[Appellees' 
Appellants contend that their interpretation of the 
Eagle Act is both demanded by the statute and necessary for 
accomplishment of its protective purpose. Appellants note 
that many state statutes ban the sale of wildlife lawfully 
taken outside the state in order to facilitate enforcement of 
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statutes. See Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 
(1936); New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 
( 1908). Appellants argue that the protective intent behind 
the Eagle Act is as strong as that behind the Endangered 
Species Act, and they point out how forcefully this Court 
enforced the latter in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
[Appellants' Brief at 18-20] 
B. Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
(1) The language of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
does not ban trading in pre-preservation feathers, but it 
gives the Secretary of the Interior authority broad enough to 
support such a ban. Section 703, 16 U.S.C., makes it 
unlawful (without a permit) to take, possess, sell, purchase, 
exchange, or transport any protected migratory bird or II any 
part • . • of such bird, or any product, whether or not 
manufactured, which consists • • • of any such bird or any 
part •.. thereof •.•. " Section 704 then authorizes the 
Secretary, with due regard to the habits, distribution, 
abundance, and economic value of the birds, to determine by 
regulation "to what extent, if at all, •.• it is compatible 
with [the underlying treaties] to allow hunting, taking, 
capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, 
transportation, carriage, or export of any such birds, or any 
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appellees do not, that the language about the habits and 
abundance of the birds indicates that the Secretary's 
authority extents only to hunting regulations and the control 
of newly taken game. 
(2) The Act's legislative history sheds no direct 
light on the extent of the Secretary's authority under§ 704. 
Two amendments, however, have elaborated the scope of§ 703. 
In 1936, when the statute was amended to include birds 
covered by the treaty with Mexico, Congress added bird parts 
to the items that cannot be taken, possessed, sold, 
purchased, exchanged, or transported. Act of June 20, 1936, 
c. 634, § 3, 49 Stat. 1555. The legislative history contains 
no discussion of this change. In 1974, when the statute was 
amended to implement new treaties with Japan and Mexico, 
Congress extended the statute's prohibitions to bird 
products. Act of June 1, 1974, Pub. L. 93-300, § 1, 88 Stat. 
190. The House committee report noted that the Secretary's 
regulations already included bird products in the definition 
of "birds," 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 ( 1974), and declared that the 
change was for clarification. H.R. Rep. No. 93-936, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4 ( 1974); ~ 120 Cong. Rec. 9304 (April 
2, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Dingell for the Committee). 
The number of species protected under the Act has 
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new treaties and regulations add birds covered by protocols 
to old treaties. Some of the feathers on appellees' 
artifacts are from species not protected until 1972 or 1974, 
after at least one appellee acquired parts of his collection. 
[A. 54] 
Penal ties for most violations of the Act remain 
small ($500 and/or 6 months), although a 1960 amendment makes 
it a felony to take "any migratory bird" for profit. Pub. L. 
86-732, 74 Stat. 866 (1960) [codified at 16 u.s.c. § 707 (b)-
( C) ] • The felony provision apparently applies only to the 
taking of birds from the current population. 
(3) Not until January, 1974 did the Fish and ~ 
Wildlife Service promulgate a regulation prohibiting the ~ · 
purchase, sale, or exchange of birds or parts from birds _____________ _;;__ ________ ~-------
taken before the dates of federal protection. See 50 C.F.R. 
§ 21.2(a) (1974) [current version at 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) 
(1978)]. The regulation is substantially identical to its r 
companion regulation under the Eagle Act. 
(4) Appellees contend that the regulation applying 
the Migratory Bird Act to pre-preservation feathers is beyond 
the Secretary's authority. They argue that neither the Act 
nor its legislative history warrants the Secretary's 
interpretation. Indeed, they note, old decisions on federal 
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interpretation. In each case, the court dismissed the 
prosecution because the Government had not alleged that the 
birds were killed after their species was protected. United 
States v. Marks, 4 F.2d 420 (S.D. Tex. 1925); In re 
Informations Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 281 F. 546 
(D. Mont. 1922); United States -v. · Fuld Store Co., 262 F. 836 
( D. Mont. 1920). One court felt compelled to hold that the 
Act did not relate to pre-preservation birds in order to 
avoid doubts about the Act's validity under the takings 
clause. Fuld Store, supra. [Appellees' Brief at 10-13] 
Appellants contend that the Act gives the Secretary 
broad authority to promulgate regulations for the protection 
of the current bird population. The regulation applying the 
Act to pre-preservation feathers simply adopts a familiar 
method of enforcement. Appellants doubt that the old cases 
cited by appellees are correct, if they ever were, in light 
of Hughes v. Oklahoma, 47 U.S.L.W. 4447 (U.S., April 26, 
1979), which recognizes wide federal authority to regulate 
commerce in wildlife. Appellants might add, although they do 
not, that two recent court of appeals decisions have rejected 
the earlier cases. United ·states v. -Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 
496 (10th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing the lower court decision 
in Allard as involving artifacts, not live birds); United 
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curiam) ( taking of bird after protection not an element of 
the offense; leaves open question whether pre-protection 
taking is a defense). See also United States v. Blanket, 391 
F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (same as Hamel). 
c. Conclusions 
II I' 
( 1 ) The language of the Eagle Act rather clearly 
prohibits trading in pre-preservation eagle feathers. The 
legislative history contains nothing to the contrary. 
Indeed, it evinces a strong protective intent. The 
Secretary, therefore, correctly concluded that the Act bans 
all trading in eagle parts. Eagle feathers are no less eagle 
"parts" because they are part of a man-made "product," 
especially when they remain clearly identifiable. The ban on 
trading is rationally related to the protection of the 
current eagle population. Al though honest antique dealers 
would not refurbish old artifacts with new feathers, the 
Secretary need not rely on dealers' good faith. 
(2) The language of the Migratory Bird Act does not 
address the problem of pre-preservation feathers. Read most 
broadly, it prohibits even the possession of any bird part or 
bird product. Read more reasonably, it delegates to the 
Secretary substantial discretion to formulate proper rules. 
Even before Congress added the bird products language to the 
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made from birds. Borrowing a reasonable enforcement method 
from the Eagle Act, the Secretary also had banned trading in 
pre-preservation "birds" and bird "parts." Congress added 
the products language for clarification, apparently approving 
the Secretary's interpretation of the Migratory Bird Act. 
II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
If you conclude that the bird preservation statutes 
appear to authorize the ban on all trading in pre-
preservation feathers, you then must consider whether 
constitutional difficulties with that construction counsel a 
reassessment. 
A. Standing 
(1) Appellants say that appellees have no standing 
to challenge the statutes under the takings clause because 
the statutes deprive them of no property interest. Unless 
appellees acquired their feathered artifacts before the ban 
on trading in pre-preservation feathers, runs appellants' 
argument, they never possessed the right to resell the 
feathers. Appellees have not alleged acquisition before the 
ban; therefore, they apparently never possessed the interest 
that they claim has been taken by the statutes. [Appellants' 




- - 1 3. 
( 2) Appel lees respond with a blunderbuss full of 
undeveloped arguments. They say that they did acquire 
certain artifacts before trading was banned, that the ban 
also interferes with their liberty and property interests in 
pursuing their lawful occupation, and that they reasonably 
have relied on the old line of authority against application 
of the Migratory Bird Act to pre-preservation feathers. 
[Appellees' Brief at 19-22] The first argument is 
unsupported by fact-findings in the lower court, the second 
apparently relies on the due process clause despite Williams 
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955), and the third is 
only somewhat persuasive. 
Appellees' best argument is that the same threat of 
criminal prosecution for selling pre-preservation feathers 
that gives them standing to seek a more favorable 
construction of the statutes also gives them standing to 
press the constitutional side of their argument for that 
statutory construction. They are not raising a naked takings 
clause challenge; they are seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the Government is reading the statutes too broadly. The 
lower court found that appellees deal in artifacts containing 
pre-preservation feathers, and the appellants do not dispute 
it. Thus, appellees have a clear financial stake in securing 
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these wares without fear of prosecution. They need not prove 
that they themselves possess property interests taken by the 
statutes. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 ( 1975) 
( female seller of beer has standing to argue that ban on 
sales to under-aged males denies them equal protection 
because ban directly interferes with her business). 
B. Property 
I ( '\ 
The initial question in the takings clause analysis 
is whether the bird preservation statutes affect a property 
interest. ....______..... 
question: 
Only if they do need one reach the second 
whether the statutes and regulations 
unconstitutionally take that interest. Appellees claim that 
the Secretary's interpretation of the statutes denies owners 
of pre-preservation artifacts the basic right to dispose of 
their property. 
process J 
clause, protects only property interests "already acquired." 
( 1 ) The takings clause, like the due 
Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); 
United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(defendant convicted for sale of migratory birds not deprived 
of property because birds acquired subject to restrictive 
permits). Unless artifact owners once acquired a right to 
dispose of their feathered antiquities, the statutes banning 
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( 2) If owners obtained their artifacts after 
trading became illegal, the very act of acquisition was 
unlawful. Indeed, illegally purchased eagle feathers were 
subject to forfeiture. 16 U.S.C. § 668b(b). Furthermore, 
the regulations under both conservation statutes clearly 
proscribed the resale of all pre-preservat i on feathers. As 
to feathers acquired after the ban on trading, therefore, 
artifact owners never acquired the right of disposition which 
appellees claim would be taken by the Secretary's 
construction of the statutes. See United States v. Allard, 
397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mont. 1975) (rejecting appellee Allard's 
constitutional defense to criminal prosecution because he did 
not show lawful acquisition). 
The only real argument for concluding that artifact 
owners acquired the right of disposition even if they 
obtained feathers after the ban is weak. It runs as follows. -In light of the old line of decisions holding that the 
Migratory Bird Act did not apply to pre-preservation 
feathers, persons might have concluded that the Secretary's 
ban on the trade in such feathers was beyond his authority. 
They also might have concluded that feathers in man-made 
artifacts were not "bird parts" within the meaning of the 
statutes. 
feathered 
Indeed, there was an active and open trade in 














expectation, they would argue, gives them a protected 
property interest. But cf. United States v. Allard, 397 F. 
Supp. 429, 431-32 ( D. Mont. 1975) (rejecting similar 
arguments in a criminal case) . . 
C. Taking 
(1) If artifact owners do have a property interest 
in the right to dispose of their feathered artifacts because 
they acquired the items before the ban on trading, the next 
question is whether the ban on trading unconstitutionally 
takes that interest. The Court could avoid this question. 
- / 
It could simply hold that as applied to these appellees--who 
neither alleged nor proved that they or persons with whom 
they deal acquired pre-preservation feathers before the ban--
the bird preservation statutes present no constitutional 
difficulty. Alternatively, the Court could remand in order 
to give appellees an opportunity to prove that they or 
persons with whom they deal acquired feathers before the ban. 
Absent a showing that someone who now possesses feathers ever 
acquired a property interest in the right to sell them, the 
courts need not decide whether the statutes take that 
interest. 
{µ" Several considerations, however, militate strongly -
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that appellees or others did acquire certain feathers before 
the ban on trading. The regulation against trading in pre-
preservation migratory bird feathers did not issue until 
1974. See p. 9 supra. Indeed, some feathers commonly found 
on Indian artifacts are from birds--such as crows, hawks, 
owls, and quail--that were not protected until 1972 or 1974. 
Compare 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1978) and 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 
( 1974), with 50 C.F.R. § 11.1 ( 1972). Second, the federal 
government continues to bring new species of migratory birds 
under its protection. Thus, appellees, who have an ongoing 
interest in the feather trade, have a real interest in a r-
complete adjudication of their challenge to the bird ___,, 
protection statutes. Third, the question whether the ban on 
trading effects an unconstitutional taking of property 
already acquired is not extremely difficult. 
(2) This Court's recent opinion on the takings 
clause in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978), tried to bring some order to the welter 
of doctrine in the area. Mr. Justice Brennan's summary of 
the factors relevant in deciding whether property has been 
taken, however, blends doctrinal strains that are sometimes 
inconsistent with each other. While Penn Central echoes 
Justice Holmes' view that an important consideration is "the 
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investment-backed expectatations," id. at 124, 127, it relies 
heavily on the first Justice Harlan's view that mere 
limitations on--as opposed to appropriations of--a property 
interest are not unconstitutional takings, id. at 125-27, 
--; 
130-32. See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
Yale L.J. 36, 38-46 (1964). Nevertheless, Penn Central sheds 
substantial light on the takings issue in this case. 
Penn Central upheld a historic-preservation 
regulation that significantly infringed the petitioner's 
investment-backed expectations. It also reaffirmed Miller v. 
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 ( 1928), which held that the complete 
destruction of one sort of property (cedar trees which harbor 
rust) for the protection of another (apple trees subject to 
infection) was within the police power. 438 U.S. at 125-26, 
133. See also Maher v. -New ·Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 
1975) (ordinance preventing the demolition and requiring the 
proper maintenance of historic property not a taking). 
A ban on the sale of pre-preservation feathers 
seems very similar to the government regulations that 
withstood takings clause challenges in Penn Central and 
Miller. Each regulation prohibits a use of property that 
endangers something the public has a legitimate interest in 
preserving--historic buildings, valuable orchards, or the 
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subject to the ban is reduced, but less substantially than 
the value of the property destroyed in Miller. Artifact 
owners can retain the items intact, transport them, display 
them for profit, and perhaps make other use of them under 
special permits from the Secretary. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 
(1978). 
( 3) Appellees contend, however, that the ban on 
trading in feathered artifacts goes far beyond what is 
necessary to protect the legitimate public interest in bird 
preservation. Since no one can reliably distinguish between 
old and new feathers, this argument is unpersuasive. The 
government does exempt 1 icensed trading in some lawfully-
taken post-preservation feathers, 50 C.F.R. § 20.91 (1978), 
but an exemption based on the supposed age of the feathers 
would be nearly impossible to administer. The relationship 
between the government's purpose and the means it employs is 
1 ike the relationship approved in United States v. Central 
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 166-67 ( 1958). There, a 
federal order closed all gold mines in order to create a 
profit motive 
essential uses. 
for diverting mining equipment to more 
The Court found no unconstitutional taking 
of the gold mining companies' property. Here, the regulation 
closing the market in pre-preservation feathers destroys the 
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(4) Appellees also contend that the right of 
disposition is so fundamental that it cannot be taken without 
compensation unless 
harmful. In Muqler 
an owner's property is 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 
noxious or 
(1887), for 
example, the Court upheld a ban on the sale of pre-
prohibition beer because the legislature had determined that 
the beverage was a nuisance. Likewise, in Gardner v. 
Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905), the Court sustained an 
ordinance against the sale of garbage because the stuff was a 
menace to public health. Indeed, appellees argue, the 
destruction of property sustained in Miller v. Schoene, 
supra, was valid only because the cedar trees were infected. 
This argument has inherent appeal, but it ought not 
prevail. First, the Miller opinion made it clear that the 
Court was not upholding destruction of infected trees on the 
grounds that they were a nuisance. It expressly declared 
that the destruction was valid bec ause it was the only way to 
preserve other, more valuable property. 276 U.S. 272, 280. 
Second, the first Justice Harlan's earlier opinions in Mugler 
and Gardner are misleading because they are couched in terms 
of his nuisance theory of the takings clause. That theory 
characterized uses of property inimical to some public 
interest as nuisances; it then reasoned that abatement of a 
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maintain it. The theory is attractive because it builds on 
common law notions about property rights. It is 
unsatisfactory, however, because nuisance becomes a 
conclusory label for any property use which the public has an 
adequate interest in preventing. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick factory held a nuisance after city 
expanded around it; real objection not to some inherent vice 
of the property, but to its conflicting use). See generally 
Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1470-
73 (1978). Thus, Mugler and Gardner really stand not only 
for the proposition that the government can prohibit the sale 
of noxious goods, but also for the proposition that the 
government can prohibit the sale of other property that poses 
some threat to the public interest. Disposition is simply 
one use of property, and there is no principled distinction 
between disposition and other uses. Indeed, one could say 
that the use prohibited in Penn Central was the disposition--
through leases or otherwise--of space atop Grand Central 
Station. 
Given the special facts of th i s case, rejection of 
appellees' argument need not create a general precedent for 
upholding bans on the disposition of non-noxious property. 
Pre-preservation feathers, although inherently innocent, 
~ ---- --------- --
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indistinguishable ----------- from feathers that have been taken --------------- - - ·----- ---- ----- ---illegally. There probably are few sorts of property so -----difficult to identify. 
C. Conclusion 
(1) Some of the appellees possess and wish to sell 
Indian antiquities containing pre-preservation bird feathers. 
Therefore, even though the lower court did not find that 
appellees acquired their artifacts before resale became 
illegal, the threat of criminal prosecution for reselling 
gives appellees standing to argue that the bird protection 
statutes do not apply to pre-preservation feathers. Their 
argument that the takings clause requires such a construction 
of the laws is within the scope of their standing. 
(2) The Secretary's interpretation of the Eagle Act 





of the right to sell pre-preservation ----------------------------------
I feathers. (a) Persons who acquired feathers ~ r the ban on trading never even acquired the right of disposition. ( b) 
Persons who acquired feathers before the ban did acquire the 
right of disposition, but the extinction of that right in the 
interest of protecting the current bird population is not a 
taking in the constitutional sense. (c) Consequently, no 
doubt about the constitutional validity of the statutes as 
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CHAM BE R S OF 
JUSTIC E WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~rurl~ 1f}. QJ. ZOffeJ!,~ 
October 4, 1979 
RE: No. 78-740 Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Chief: 
/ 
I'll try my hand at an opinion for the Court 
in the above. 
The Chief Justice 
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UA__~ ~- r 
4~ ~~~ 
To: · IA><--~tvJ-- 29 October 1979 Mr. Justice Powell ~ ~
From: Gregory May 
:J-A-4-o~~ ~ 
4-~o. 78-740: Andrus v. Allard ~ -
I have reviewed Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in this 
case. His construction of the two statutes in Part I is quite 
good and, as far as I can tell without checking some of the ---citations, entirely correct. His treatment of the takings 
c~ in Part II, however, -----.. seems rather facile. It 
makes the case precedent for the overly broad propositions ( 1) 
that denial of the right to sell "does not in itself amount to a 
taking," draft at 14, and ( 2) that "loss of future profits--
unaccompanied by any physical ... restriction [on property]--
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim," id. 
at 15. 
( 1) The first proposition does find support in the 
cases, but it is too baldly stated. The cases upholding 
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decided under the first Justice Harlan's "nuisance theory" of 
the takings clause. See also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
( 1928) ( diseased cedars); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 3 25 
(1905) (garbage). That theory characterized uses of property 
inimical to some public interest as nuisances; it then reasoned 
that abatement of a nuisance was not a taking because the owner 
had no right to maintain nuisances. Although the nuisance 
theory has been largely discredited, the cases ought not to be 
cut loose entirely from their rationale. 
I 
Thf cases do stand for the proposition that 11_ot:_ ev_~r_y 
denial of the right to sell property is a taking. But there is 
a difference in emphasis between that proposition and the 
conclusion that denial of the right to sell does not in itself 
amount to a taking. The cases simply establish that the 
the sale of property that poses some government can prohibit --
threat to the public interest. (The navigational servitude 
cases cited at page 14 of the draft rest on that same 
✓ 
perception, although citing them out of their special context is 
itself a dangerous precedent.) Thus, a proper treatment of the 
takings clause issue here would refer to the danger that feather 
trading poses to the public's interest in conservation. And it 
would mention the unusual fact that justifies such an 
extraordinary exercise of regulatory power in this case--the 
inability to distinguish new feathers from old ones. 
Mr. Justice Brennan could reply that this argument 
, ..... 
_,. - - 3. 
confuses the question whether the government has a right to 
regulate under the pol ice power with the question whether it 
must pay compensation for the effects its regulation has on 
private property. The distinction has merit as an analytical 
matter, but takings clause cases often involve a balancing of 
the private interest against the public interest. In Miller v. 
Schoene, supra, for example, the Court upheld the destruction of 
infected cedars because such an extraordinary regulation was 
necessary for the protection of other, more valuable property 
(apple orchards). And the Court has held that massive 
destruction of private property under the war power did not 
constitute a taking, even though such an action in peacetime 
almost certainly would be compensable. United States v. Caltex, 
344 U.Sa 149 (1952) (total destruction of an oil refinery in the 
Phillipines). Indeed, Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 290 U.S. 393 (1922), recognizes that takings 
clause analysis is a process of balancing the need to govern 
against the interests of the individual property owner. Thus, 
the extent to which the public interest advanced by a regulation 
requires the regulatory intrusion on private property is 
relevant to the resolution of a takings claim. And Mr. Justice 
Brennan's suggestion at p. 16 n.24 that no importance should be 
attached to the nature of the public interest upon which a 
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(2) Perhaps interference with future profits from 
property is less offensive to the takings clause than physical 
interference with the property itself. ( Fuller and Perdue on 
contract damages shed little light on that question.) In 
economic terms, however, both interferences have the same 
effect: they reduce the present value of private property. That 
the loss is more palpable in one case should make no difference. 
The question in either case is whether the loss inflicted f 
constitutionally unacceptable. Thus, it is helpful to discuss--
as Mr. Justice Brennan has--the extent to which a regulation 
interferes with an owner's return on his property. But it is 
misleading--and dangerously so--to declare that loss of future 
profits is a "slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." 
(3) Some other problems with the opinion are less 
serious. 
J( \..' 
(a) As my bench memo suggests, I would base standing on 
a rather different ground. One scarcely can say that appellees 
have standing to challenge a restriction on the disposition of 
their property when they may never have acquired a right of 
disposition. Draft at 13 n.21. Appellees, however, do have an 
interest in a construction of the statutes that would save them ---from criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, there may be something 
to the view that someone with nothing has standing to claim that 
he has something after all. 
(b) The opinion refuses to "exhume" the substantive due 
... 
_, - - 5. 
process theory upon which appellees' base their right to engage 
in a lawful occupation. Draft at 16 n.25. That refusal might 
benefit from citation to a decision like Williams v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955). 
~/VI 
Jr-
-e -j;uprtntt ~ltltrl cf tltt ~h j;bdts-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u~ J. '4- 2llffe'!~ 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 78-740, Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bi 11, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





• ;®ujrrnttt (')our! of 14, pnittb '-" 
~lUlpngfon. l9. QJ. 2llffeJ.l., 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 78-740 - An~rus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
Pl ease join me. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




October 30, 1979 
/ 
- -;§1iprtmt <!Jou.rt of tqt 'Jiltriitb ,®tatts-
1llas}rington. JD. <q. 21l,SJ1~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 










.Stt.pttm:t QJ'au:rt .of t4t ~h- ~taftg 
~l«Jfrittghttt. ~- (!}. 2ilffe~.;t 
October 31, 1979/ 
No. 78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Brennan . 
Copies to the Conference 
cmc 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
.S~ttttt <qomt o-f tlrt ~b' .Sbdt.&' 
'1'u-Jrhtghttt. ~. (!I. 2llffe'l, 
October 31, 1979 
Re: 78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
✓ 
Further study of this case persuades me that you are 
correct in stating that a flat proscription on the sale of 
wildlife, without regard to the legality of its takjng, is 
and for a long time has been a trad i tional legisl.ative 
tool for enforcing conservation pol i cy. On that 
understanding, even though I was original.ly of the other 
view, it does seem realistic to assume that Congress meant 
exactly what its language seems to say. 
The Court's opinion in New York ex rel, Si l z v. 
Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (]908}, makes it clear that state 
game laws could (and apparently did} make it illegal 
during a closed season to possess game lawfully taken in 
another state. When the Eagle Protection Act was passed 
in 1940, it did not apply to AJaska (or, of course, 
Canada} but its prohibitions against commerce in eagles 
within the forty-eight states quite c l early appl i ed to 
eagles taken in Alaska or Canada. It follows, I believe, 
that the prohibition appJ.ied to eagles that were "lawfully 
taken. 3 I think it wou l d be hard to maintain that 
Congress intended to draw a distinction between (a) eagles 
that were lawfully taken because of the place of 
taking-- i .e., Alaska or Canada; and (b} eagles that were 
lawfully taken because of the t i me of taking-- i .e., before 
the Act was passed. 
What all this means is that my planned d i ssent will 
not materialize, and I wi l l join your op i n i on. 
Respectful.1 y, 
Mr. J ustice Brennan JL 
Copies to the Conference 
I agree with your excellent treatment of the ~ 
statutory issues in this case, but I have some difficulty 
with your "takinq clause" oiscussion. I am troubled by the 
hroad statements that denial of the riqht to sell orooerty 
"~oes not in itself amount to a takinq" (p. 14) arid that 
"loss of future profits ••• provides a slender reed upon 
which to rest a takinqs claim" (P. 15). - -~ 
As I read the cases you have cited for the first 
proposition, they simply establish that the government can 
~rohibit the sale of property that poses some threat to the 
public interest. They are rooted in the "nuisance theory" of 
the taking clause. Thus, while it is true that not everv 
denial of the fundamental right to sell is a taking 1n a 
constitutional sense, that . extraordinary intrusion on 
property rights is permissl ble only when lesser measures 
cannot accomplish an important government purpese. 
Since the taking clause analysis is a balancinq of 
the need to govern against the interests of private property 
owners, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 290 U.S. 393 (1922), what 
the government is trying to achieve has an effect on whether 
compensation is due. See United States v. Caltex, 344 u.s. 
149. (1952) (total destruction of an oil refinery not a taking 
because of wartime necessity)1 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 
272 (1928) (destruction of infected cedars not a taking 
because necessary for the orotection of orchards more 
valuable to the community). The unusual fact that iustifies 
an extraoroinary interference with private property in this 
case is the inability to distinguish new feathers from old 
-
2. 
I quite agree that it is necessary to consiner the 
extent to which a regulation interferes with an owner's 
return on his property. Rut the very need to engaqe in that 
inquiry shows, ! think, that interference with future profits 
is no less offensive to the takings clause than physical 
interference with the property itself. In economic terms,. 
both interferences have the same effect: they reduce the 
present value of property. I therefore could not say that 
loss of future orofits is a •slender reed upon which to rest 
a takinqs claim.• 
Although I too think that appellees have standing 
to raise the takinq clause issue, I have some aoubt about the 
suqqestion that they have stanoinq to challenge a restriction 
on the disposition of property even if they never lawfully 
acquired a r.ight of disnosition. I should have thought that 
appellees had standing because they have an interest in a 
construction of the statutes that would save them from 
criminal prosecution. Indeeo, criminal prosecution is what 
they complained about when they brought this suit to overturn 
the Secretary's regulations. 
If you find it possible to accommodate these 
thouqhts, I will be happy to join you. Otherwise, I will 
write. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 




JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~Mfrutghtn. J. ~. 2ll&i~~ 
November 1, 1979 
RE: No. 78-740 Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you very much for your comments on the op1n1on 
in the above. Would it meet your concerns if at page 14 I 
rephrased 11 does not in itself amount to a taking" to read 
11 does not in itself necessarily amount to a taking. 11 
And at page 15 rephrase 11 loss of future profits . 
provides a slender reed, etc. 11 to read 11 loss of future 
profits ... often provides~ a slender reed, etc. 11 
On the matter of standing would it meet your concerns 
if I were to add to note 21 at page 13 the following brief 
paragraph: 
11 Moreover appe 11 ees face possible criminal 
prosecutions for violations of the statutes which 
of itself suffices to give them standing to liti-
gate their interest in the construction of the 
statutes. 11 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~~A.t.•·7 ~ 




,/i ,,. er/ 
I ,,. ✓.• 
l 
- . , ' 
Dear Bill: 
I appreciate your willingness to consider some 
relatively small changes to accommodate my concerns. Rather 
than the language you suggest, would you be willinq to 
incorporate the substance of the following alternative 
suggestions. 
Change the third sentence in the second paraqraph on 
page 14 to read "But the denial of one traditional property 
right does not always amount to a taking•. 
In the third sentence of the last paraqraph on that 
same page, substitute the word •necessarily" for the word 
•simply" in the phrase •a reduction in the value of property 
is not simply equated with a taking•. , 
In the second sentence on page 15 say "At any rate, 
any reduction in appellees' potential economic benefit is 
attributable to a loss of future profits rather than to a 
physical interference with the use of the property•. And, 
the final sentence of the paragraph, could you say •the 
interest in anticipated gains traditionally has been viewed 
as more amenable to regulation than other property 
interests•. 
Your proposal for an addition to footnote 21 is 
generally acceptable to me, but I would add it to the 
existing paragraph and begin it with "All appellees, however, 
face •••• • 
I don't think any of these suggestions change the 








solely to avoiding lanquage 
in a different context. 
Sincerely, 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 5 November 1979 
From: Gregory May 
No. 78-740: Andrus v~ Allard 
The Brennan clerk responsible for the opinion in this 
case called this morning to say that Mr. Justice Brennan will 
accept all of the changes that you suggested except the changes 
on page 1 5. He was not certain whether Mr. Just ice Brennan 
himself would send you a letter on this. The language that Mr. 
Justice Brennan will not change is, I think, the worst part of 
his opinion. 
I see several difficulties with this paragraph of the 
draft. In the first place, this case does not really concern 
"loss of future profits'' in the usual sense. It concerns denial 
of the right to realize the present value of property. Property 
has economic value to its owner both because it can create a 
stream of future profits and because it can be sold for a price. 
The sale price, of course, generally approximates the present 
., 
L. • - -
value of future profits. But the regulation at issue in this 
case does not reduce the sale price by diminishing the expected 
stream of profits: 
altogether. Thus, 
it reduces the price by outlawing the sale 
the regulation does not diminish future 
profits. It simply interferes with the owner's present ability 
to realize the value of those profits. This deferral of 
enjoyment need not constitute a taking in the constitutional 
sense. 
The real problem in this case is that the sale price 
probably would reflect intrinsic values greater than the 
capitalized future earnings of the property. A ban on sales, 
therefore, prevents the economic realization of those non-
economic values. It is at this point, I think, that Mr. Justice 
Brennan's point about refusing to give great weight to 
speculative and subjective types of value has some validity. 
Perhaps the taking clause protects no more than what one can 
earn from the use of property or realize in return for selling 
the right of use. For simplicity of administration, perhaps the 
government can assume that subjective, non-economic values are 
not "property." 
In the second place, having mischaracterized the 
problem, the paragraph goes on to suggest that future profits 
are entitled to less protection under the taking clause. That 
suggestion contains, I am afraid, elements of truth. But it 




less protected because they are less important. They are what 
determ ~ne the present value of property, and that value 
clearl1i protected. The interest in future profits, however, 
is 
is 
more subject to regulation for at least two reasons. First, 
future profits are speculative. That does not mean that a 
property owner has less right to them; it just means that courts 
have a hard time determining what his rights are. Second, in 
the wo1ds of Justice Holmes' Pa. Coal opinion, government hardly 
could go on if it had to pay for every interference with its 
citizen 's expectations. 
These problems with the draft create some reason for 
you to write separately. But you also might consider whether a 
concur~ ing opinion that highlights the danger in the majority 
view and yet attracts no other votes would do more harm than 
good. ~sit stands, the danger might go largely unnoticed. 
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CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
November 5, 1979 
Re: No. 78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
I share doubts similar, though probably not identical, 
to those expressed by Lewis in his letter to you of 
October 31st. I shall therefore await further developments. 
Sincerel~y 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
~np:rtntt <!f curl of tfrt ~h ~tau~ 
'cJfa,s~ J. <lf. 2llffe'1, 
November 6, 1979 
RE: No. 78-740 Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Lewis: 
-
Thank you for your thoughtful suggestions for revision. 
I will be pleased to adopt changes 1 and 2 {page 14) and 
change 4 (addition to footnote 21). I am afraid, however, 
that I cannot incorporate your requested change of page 15. 
I'm afraid that the language you propose would materially 
alter the sense of that passage beyond what I can accept. 
I appreciate that this may mean that you will write sepa-
rately but at least we did try. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
-l - - Jd,,__,,_,/~ 
GM 11-7-79 
No. 78-740: Andrus v. Allard 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
Today we hold that regulations that prevent~ the 
appellees' from selling artifacts containing the feathers of 
do1' not amo ~nt ~o 
TL..-~.s-~~ 
protected birds a taking 




First, the regulations at issue interfere with none of the 
appellees' other property rights. All other rights of 
alienation and all other uses of the property are unimpaired. 
Ante, at 14. Second, the regulations do not interfere unjustly 
--
with the appellees' future profits from their property. Ante, 
at 15-16. I agree that the regulations are valid, but I would 
characterize their interference with appellees' property rights 
somewhat differently. 
~
~ y roperty has value to its owner because he can use it 
to generate ~ profits or sell it for a price. Th e 
property's economic value is the same in either case since the 
sale price ~ -S-H RI).y y"'l approx 1ma tes the oresent value of expected 
future profits. Thus, interferences with future profits ma 
give rise to substantial claims under the taking clause. Bu 
the ban on trading feathers does not prevent appellees fro 
using their property to generate a stream of profits. The ba 
interferes with the appellees' present ability to realize th 




- - 2. 
economic value of appellees' pro t:ien:.y; ,L L g eLer~ 
alization of th --/k ~~~--d~rt,---
o/ ~$' ~ ~ 
~ion pre .;Qet s ::Jl,.:i en tY effle~ a__ 
question under the taking clause because it is a 
restraint on the fundamental right of free alienation. Our 
cases, however, recognize that the government can prohibit the 
sale of property that poses some threat to the public interest. 
See, e.g., Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924); 
Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905); cf. Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of one type of property 
necessary for protection of another). In this case, the absence 
of a reliable method for distinguishing new feathers from old 
ones makes any trading in the feathers of protected birds a 
threat to the living bird population. This unusual circumstance 
. 
warrants what otherwise would be an impermissible ~ 
on appellees' property rights. I therefore join the Court in 
concluding that the Eagle and Migratory Bird statutes, as we 
have construed them, do not violate whatever property rights 
appellees lawfully may have acquired in their feathered 
artifacts. 
' 
- - ~ -r-,-:1~ 
GM 11-8-79 
No. 78-740: Andrus v. Allard 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
Today we hold that regulations that prevent the 
appellees' from selling artifacts containing the feathers of 
protected birds do not amount to a taking in the constitutional 
sense. The Court's opinion rests this conclusion on two 
grounds. First, the regulations at issue interfere with none of 
the appellees' other property rights. All other rights of 
alienation and all other uses of the property are unimpaired. 
Ante, at 14. Second, the regulations do not interfere uniustly 
with the appellees' future profits from their property. Ante, 
at 1 5-1 6. I agree that the regulations are valid, but I would 
characterize their interference with appellees' property rights 
somewhat differently. 
Commercial property has value to its owner because he 
can use it to generate .,..._~e-am- ·-o. profits or sell it for a ✓ 
price. The ban against sale of appellees' property presents a 
serious question under the Taking Clause because it is a 
restraint on the fundamental right of free alienation. Our 
cases, however, recognize that the government can prohibit the 
sale of property that poses some threat to the public interest. 
See, e.g., Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924): 
Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905): cf. Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of one type of property 
! - - 2. 
necessary for protection of another). In this case, the absence 
of a reliable method for distinguishing new feathers from old 
ones makes any trading in the feathers of protected birds a 
threat to the living bird population. This unusual circumstance 
warrants what otherwise would be an impermissible deprivation of 
appellees' property rights. I therefore join the Court in 
concluding that the Eagle and Migratory Bird statutes, as we 
have construed them, do not violate whatever property rights 
appellees lawfully may have acquired in their feathered 
artifacts. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
' Today we hold that regulations that prevent the appellees' 
from selling artifacts containing the feathers of protected 
birds do not amount to a taking in the .constitutional sense. 
The Court's opinion rests this conclusion on two grounds. 
First, the regulations at issue interfere with none of the ap-
pellees' other property rights. All other rights of alienation 
and all other uses o{ the property are unimpaired. Ante, at 
14. Second, the regulations do not interfere unjustly with 
the appellees' future profits from their propei::ty. Ante, at 
15-16. I agree that the regulations' are _valid, but I would 
characterize their iriterference with appellees' property rights 
somewhat differently. 
Commercial property has value to its owner because he 
can use it to generate profits or sell it for a price. The ban 
against sale of appellees' property presents a serious question 
under the Taking Clause because it is a restraint on the 
fundamental right of free alienation. Our cases, however, 
recognize that the government can prohibit the sale of prop-
erty that poses some threat to the public interest. See, e. g., 
Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1924); Gardner 
v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325 (1905); cf. Miller v. Schoene, 276 
U. S. 272 ( 1928) ( destruction of one type of property neces-
sary for protection of another). In this case, the absence 
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-
ones makes any trading in the feathers of protected birds a 
threat to the living bird population. This unusual circum-
stance warrants what otherwise would be an impermissible 
deprivation of appellees' property rights. I therefore join 
the Court in concluding that the Eagle and Migratory Bird 
statutes, as we have construed them, do not violate whatever 
property rights appellees lawfully may have acquired in the~r 
feathered artifacts. 

CHAM BE R S OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 
·e -j)iqrrnnt (!Jourt of tqt ~h j>taftg 
~asqingtc~ ~. QJ. 20,SJ!..;l 
November 19, 19✓ 
78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
I .am now persuaded that the "wildlife" aspect places 
this case in a somewhat different category from Penn Central. 
However, I conclude that the best I can do is join the 
judgment. In that "dubitante" status!, I am more 
comfortable joining only the judgment. 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
/ Regards, 
wo 
- -~u:prtutt (!Illltrl of tlf t ~h .§tatts--as Irittg~ ~- ar. 2!lffe'l-~ 
·1 
CHAMBERS OF I 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 20, 1979 
Re: No. 78-740 - Andrus v. Allard 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely✓ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
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